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NASA STI Program…in Profile 
 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated  
to the advancement of aeronautics and space 
science. The NASA scientific and technical 
information (STI) program plays a key part in 
helping NASA maintain this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information 
Officer. It collects, organizes, provides for 
archiving, and disseminates NASA’s STI. The 
NASA STI program provides access to the 
NTRS Registered and its public interface, the 
NASA Technical Reports Server, thus 
providing one of the largest collections of 
aeronautical and space science STI in the 
world. Results are published in both non-NASA 
channels and by NASA in the NASA STI 
Report Series, which includes the following 
report types: 
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports 
of completed research or a major 
significant phase of research that present 
the results of NASA programs and 
include extensive data or theoretical 
analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data 
and information deemed to be of 
continuing reference value. NASA 
counterpart of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and 
extent of graphic presentations. 
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. 
Scientific and technical findings that are 
preliminary or of specialized interest, e.g., 
quick release reports, working papers, and 
bibliographies that contain minimal 
annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. 
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, 
seminars, or other meetings 
sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. 
Scientific, technical, or historical 
information from NASA programs, 
projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. 
English-language translations of 
foreign scientific and technical 
material pertinent to NASA’s 
mission. 
 
Specialized services also include creating 
custom thesauri, building customized 
databases, and organizing and publishing 
research results. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
• Access the NASA STI program home 
page at http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
• E-mail your question via to 
help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at  
(757) 864-9658 
 
• Write to: 
NASA STI Information Desk 
Mail Stop 148 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23681-2199 
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TCL2 National Campaign Human Factors Brief 
 
Lynne Martin1, Cynthia A. Wolter2, 
Ashley N. Gomez2, and Joey S. Mercer1 
 
 
 
The Technology Capability Level-2 National Campaign (TCL2nc) was conducted at six 
different test sites located across the United States during May and June of 2017. The 
campaign resulted in over 240 data collection flights using 24 different aircraft and 
involving 23 flight crews. Flights not only varied in duration but also in the environments 
and terrains over which they flew. The TCL2nc highlighted beyond visual line of sight 
and altitude-stratified operations and saw five partners bring their own, independently 
built, UAS Service Supplier (USS) for use during the flight tests. This document presents 
data collected during the TCL2nc that informs the ‘Operator’ section of the 
‘Requirements/Best Practices’ from the UTM Technical Capability Matrix and 
Guidelines to Operate (Rios, version as of March 2017). 
 
A review of the data collected indicated that although teams were well qualified on paper 
(in terms of both completing training and having experience with flying UAS vehicles), 
greater consideration should be given to the unique perspectives and backgrounds of 
future UAS operators. Overall, teams looked at a variety of sources for information, 
including USS client-displays, and participants became more mindful of the need to be 
aware of other vehicles, highlighting the value of reporting information. Observations 
found that flight crews’ time to respond to a UTM issue depended heavily on the team 
structure, communication efficiency, and crew procedures. These points are discussed in 
more detail in this publicationn. 
 
 
1.0 Background 
As part of NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) effort 
(Kopardekar et al., 2016), the Technology Capability Level-2 National Campaign (TCL2nc) flight 
demonstrations took place during four weeks in May–June 2017 and involved six test sites located 
across the United States. Those four weeks encompassed eleven calendar days on which vehicles 
flew test flights, sometimes at more than one test site concurrently (see Table 1 and Appendix 1). 
Over these four weeks and six test sites, there were 23 shakedown (i.e., ‘practice’) flying days and 
an additional 17 flying days for data collection. Each test site was utilized and configured to meet 
the needs of the vehicles and the criteria specified in the test scenarios. Some test sites had as many 
as five ground control station (GCS) locations from which flight crews conducted their operations 
while others had two (Figure 1a and Figure 1b). Some test sites moved the locations of their GCSs 
depending on the scenario(s) they were flying that day while others were fixed bases. Flight crews 
varied in composition and size. Flight crews from some test sites were composed of individuals from 
                                               
1 NASA Ames Research Center; Moffett Field, California. 
2 San Jose State University Foundation; NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California. 
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one organization while other test sites sent multiple crews, each from different organizations. Two-
thirds of the test sites (Sites 1, 2, 4, and 5) centrally managed their UTM service supplier (USS) 
onsite, with one USS operator (USS Op) located separately from the flight crews overseeing the 
USS operations for all of that test site’s flight crews. The other test sites integrated a USS Op within 
each flight crew. Scenarios were developed by each test site to demonstrate the UTM capabilities 
that they had proposed. Some test sites created one scenario with multiple variations to capture these 
capabilities while other test sites constructed multiple unique scenarios. 
 
Table 1. Flight Days and Shakedown Days for the TCL2nc 
 
Key: Orange background = a shakedown day; green background = a data-collection day. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Example of a UAS test range with five fixed GCS. 
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Figure 1b. Example of a UAS test range with four variable GCS. 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Participant Roles and Responsibilities 
Flight crews varied in number and affiliation: some had just two individuals while others had 
approximately twelve in their crews (Appendix 2). Primary flight crew positions included those 
listed in Table 2 and additional positions staffed by some, if not all, of the flight test sites are listed 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 2: Crew Member Roles and Responsibilities 
Crew Member Role Crew Member Responsibilities 
Pilot-in-command (PIC) Serve as the main pilot for the vehicle. 
GCS operator (GCSO) Work the vehicle’s flight planning and flight execution software. 
USS operator (USS Op) Monitor and interact with USS displays (and NASA). 
Hardware and software flight 
engineers 
Support specific technical aspects of the 
vehicle. 
Visual observers (VOs) Safety monitors who provide visual contact with the vehicles at all times. 
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Table 3: Test Site Support Personnel Roles and Responsibilities 
Test Site Role Responsibilities of This Role 
UTM manager Ensure the USS software is running and conduct troubleshooting when needed. 
Radio control (RC) safety 
pilots 
Serve as alternate pilots if the PIC needs 
assistance. 
Flight test manager Coordinate the crews and flights to conduct the test scenarios properly. 
NASA researchers and 
observers 
Collect observational and survey data; 
observers were available to support media 
day and answer flight team questions. 
 
 
Although each test site created their own configurations of personnel, two types of team 
organization emerged with respect to UTM. One type of team organization included having the USS 
Op role as a dedicated member of the flight crew, either completing USS client management tasks 
alone or by having one crew member splitting the USS Op role with another role (e.g., at test Site 3 
the flight crew consisted of two people: a GCSO/PIC/USS Op and a safety pilot/launch engineer). 
The advantages of having the USS Op role within the flight crew team was that this person was able 
to focus completely on the crew’s mission and communications were reduced. The cost was the 
number of additional personnel or, if the role was timeshared by one team member, that periods of 
high workload were compounded if all roles were busy at the same time (e.g., at launch). A second 
type of team organization was one in which a dedicated USS Op fulfilled that role for a number of 
crews (e.g., at test Site 1 one USS Op submitted and managed the flight volumes for four flight 
crews where each flight crew consisted of a PIC, a GCSO, and a launch engineer). Four test sites 
took this “hubandspoke” approach—test Sites 1, 2, 4, and 5. The advantage of separating out the 
USS Op role was that this person became a specialist and overall required manpower was reduced. 
The cost was the increase in communications load as the USS Op had to stay in contact with all the 
flight crews they were serving and the workload related to managing multiple flights in the case that 
one flight crew/vehicle was having an off-nominal event. 
 
1.2 Vehicle Characteristics 
The vehicles flown during the demonstration were a mix of small fixed-wing, multi-rotor, and 
hybrid UAS vehicles, each with varying performance characteristics and endurance limits. There 
were 24 different models of aircraft flown. The multi-rotor vehicles were able to take-off and land 
vertically in a small area and turn on a point in the air, whereas the fixed-wing vehicles flew 
similarly to manned light-aircraft: taking off on a climbing trajectory, making banked turns in the 
air, and either gliding down into a belly landing or descending to a lower altitude before deploying a 
parachute. All of these methods required larger areas on the ground than the multi-rotor vehicles. 
Hybrid vehicles performed similarly in-flight to fixed-wing vehicles but with the vertical take-offs 
and landings of multi-rotor vehicles. 
 
Most vehicles could be controlled either by providing point-to-point direction through a GCS or 
manually by a PIC, although some were fully-automated only (GCS control only). As an 
example of the latter, Test Site 3 eventually chose to manage their operations with automated 
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control only, with no manual option (although the vehicles could have been manually controlled) 
during their flight test. During all flights, whether they were line-of-sight (LOS) or beyond visual 
line-of-sight (BVLOS), the behavior of the vehicle was monitored by at least one VO at all 
times3. In cases of unexpected vehicle behavior, the VO could contact the flight crew and/or the 
Flight Test Manager so that the appropriate action could be taken. 
 
1.3 Interfaces and Information Displays 
Equipment available at each GCS location varied widely across (and sometimes within) test sites. At 
most GCSs, several displays were available to the flight crews to give them information about their 
vehicle’s flight and some also included displays to show surrounding operations and/or aspects of 
the UTM system. For example, Test Site 3 provided four screens for its GCSO/PIC/USS Op. This 
individual did not have LOS contact with (i.e. could not see) their vehicle. Standard tools shown on 
their displays were their flight planning/execution software, a USS client, and a fusion of radar, 
multi-lateration systems, and GCS telemetry. The fourth screen was available for use to show other 
information of the GCSO/PIC/USS Op’s choice, including weather, vehicle and USS data, radio 
frequency usage, etc. Other test sites which had more mobile/portable GCSs used fewer displays. At 
Test Site 5, for example, flight crews only had a hand-held controller and one display showing the 
autopilot software for their vehicle. These flight crews did not have access to a display of UTM 
information. Instead, UTM information was verbally relayed to them by radio from a centralized 
location where the USS Op had such a display. 
 
All test sites used at least one surveillance system to provide information about the airspace not 
provided by vehicles’ on-board sensors (GPS, ADS-B), helping to identify other manned and 
unmanned aircraft flying near the test site. During the national campaign, a NASA-built iOS 
(internet and operating system) application (insight UTM [iUTM]), provided visualizations of UTM 
system information and current operations and was made available to the test sites. Test Sites 3 and 
5 elected to use iUTM as an additional situation awareness display. 
 
In the same way that there was a mix of team members and vehicle types, the partner-built interfaces 
to UTM also differed. Across the test sites, five different partner-built USSs and the NASA USS 
were used during the national campaign. Two test sites used more than one USS (Test Sites 2 and 6), 
and two test sites used the same USS (Test Sites 1 and 4). The tools and displays available within 
these USSs varied—primarily because each partner developed their USS independently, with no 
standard regarding how to display various pieces of information. The USSs were still under 
development and had a wide variety of available functions and features. To participate in the 
TCL2nc, all USSs needed to have certain basic capabilities but the manner and extent by which the 
partners met those requirements differed and are not examined in this paper. 
 
1.4 Partner Focus and Test Scenarios 
The test scenarios needed to incorporate some combination of altitude-stratified operations, BVLOS 
operations, altitude-stratified BVLOS operations, dynamic re-planning, responses to alerts from the 
UTM System, and the implementation of off-nominal contingency plans. Test sites then used their 
own test scenarios to investigate one or more of the following areas: USS technologies and 
procedures; geo-fencing technologies/conformance monitoring; ground-based surveillance/sense and 
avoid; airborne surveillance/sense and avoid (ABSAA); communication, navigation, and 
surveillance (CNS); and human factors related to UTM data creation and display. Some test sites 
                                               
3 Multiple VOs were positioned along BVLOS routes to ensure “eyes on” the vehicles at all times. 
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built only one base scenario and addressed their objectives with several small variations of that 
scenario (Figure 2). Other test sites built a variety of scenarios with each one addressing specific 
objectives and varying in length, locations, flight plans/volumes, and number of airborne vehicles 
(Figure 3). The test sites’ local geography and environment also influenced their test scenarios. For 
example, some GCSs were at airfields while other locations were in agricultural fields and some 
GCSs had tree cover while others were on marshy ground close to water. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example base scenario designed to use altitude-stratified operations, BVLOS 
operations, and altitude-stratified BVLOS operations for investigating data 
creation and display as well as USS technologies and procedures. Variations of this 
scenario were also used to investigate CNS, ground-based surveillance/sense and 
avoid, as well as geo-fencing technologies and conformance monitoring. 
 
 
Figure 3. Example objective-specific scenario, designed to use altitude-stratified operations, 
BVLOS operations, and altitude-stratified BVLOS operations to investigate responses 
to alerts from the UTM system and airborne surveillance/sense and avoid. 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
The research objectives are listed in the Operator section of the Requirements/Best Practices from 
the UTM Technical Capability Matrix and Guidelines to Operate (Rios, version as of March 2017). 
The Operator section has four areas: qualification, information requirements, reporting, and response 
time to Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) (as noted briefly in Table 4 and in its entirety in 
Appendix 10). With the goal of informing what the minimum requirements and/or best practices 
might be in each of those four areas for TCL2 operations, the driving enquiry was: How do you get 
the information you need—when you need it—to successfully fly a UAV in UTM airspace? This 
enquiry touches on the requirement for displays to provide adequate situation awareness (SA), the 
requirement to share information through a USS, the requirement of operators to have enough 
knowledge in order to understand what they are seeing, and the requirement to respond quickly 
enough when an action is needed. 
 
Table 4. Operator Topics from the Requirements/Best Practices Portion of 
the UTM Technical Capability Matrix and Guidelines to Operate 
Topic ID Capability Candidate Metrics/Measure 
Operator 
(OPR) 
OPR1 Qualification Training and operator requirements 
OPR2 Information 
requirements 
Situational awareness displays, 
notifications connected to USS 
OPR3 Reporting Ground control station or vehicle 
connected to USS 
OPR4 Response time to 
ANSP Directive 
Via USS 
 
 
The definition of operator training requirements included operator experience (with manned aircraft, 
UAVs, and UTM) as well as team organization (physical and social, including coordination, 
teamwork, and planning). The focus on information and reporting requirements encompassed the 
accessibility of UTM information, the information’s method of presentation, and the reliability of 
the information. Of note was information submission and retrieval pertaining to volumes and geo-
fences, situation awareness displays, alerting styles, telemetry reporting, and communication links. 
To investigate response time, general situation awareness, operator workload, subjective decision-
making performance, and errors were observed. 
 
2.0 Method 
During test days, teams of two researchers collected data from the participants at each test site about 
their experiences and during shakedowns; usually two researchers were present. To the extent 
possible, researchers observed all flight crews at some point across the test days. Data were collected 
in a number of ways: 
• observations of the participants during flights 
• brief post-flight questionnaires 
• end-of-day group interviews 
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All of these methods solicited feedback on the four areas of operator-specific requirements and best 
practices (Table 4). In total, 18 end-of-day group interviews were collected across the six test sites, 
totaling 8.93 hours of recordings. During these end-of-day debriefs, flight crews discussed the 
operator-specific topics as they related to the UTM operations at their test site (a tabulation of topics 
covered in the interviews are in Appendix 9). Survey items were generated with the four topics 
(Table 4) in mind but were presented to the participants in the context of the research objectives of 
the test site’s test scenarios. Approximately 40 questions were generated in the survey but conditions 
were set so that participants only answered about 15 at any one time. Most questions used a seven-
point rating format but some were multiple choice or open-ended. Two sources of operational data 
were also obtained: 
• test sites shared their telemetric flight data, and sometimes other logged data, with NASA 
• NASA’s internal records of USS data, as captured through a separate, data-aggregation 
server 
 
2.1 Initial Methodology Adjustments 
After experiencing the range of the TCL2nc’s shakedown activities, AOL researchers realized that 
some of the data collection methods that were designed to be universally applicable did not align 
well with the particular flight crew procedures or conditions at the test sites they were visiting. In 
many cases flight crews had little spare time between finishing one flight and preparing for the next 
flight. As a result, the post-flight questionnaires were moved to become end-of-day questionnaires. 
This caused fewer interruptions to the test site’s conduct of their operations but also resulted in less 
survey data. 
 
3.0 Results 
After the flight tests, researchers spent time compiling and organizing the five types of data listed 
above in the Method section. Initial intentions were to combine data to perform TCL2nc-wide 
analyses. However, so many differences were present between the test sites that the data has been 
treated more generally and, to date, only high-level points have been drawn out. These are discussed 
below. 
 
3.1 Summary of Flights 
During the TCL2nc, 611 total flight activities were recorded by UTM. Of these, 503 were live 
flights and 108 were simulated flights from a GCS communicating with UTM (Table 5). The 
TCL2nc distinguished between shakedown days and data-collection days. Shakedown days 
commonly included equipment testing (e.g., testing connectivity with UTM) while data-collection 
days focused on complete flights meant to satisfy the test scenarios. More detailed numbers 
regarding how these flight activities were distributed over the six test sites are given in Table 5. For 
the 244 live data-collection flights, NASA received 128 vehicle-based data recordings from partners, 
which will be the core data set for future analyses. 
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Table 5. Overview of all Simulated and Live Flight Activities Recorded 
by UTM during the TCL2nc 
611 total (simulated and live flight activities recorded) 
 503 – Live 108 - Simulated 
 274 – flight day 229 – shakedown 53 – flight day 55 – shakedown 
Site 1 32 22 15 0 
Site 2 32 24 5 1 
Site 3 28 39 15 10 
Site 4 69 99 16 43 
Site 5 28 9 2 1 
Site 6 85 36 0 0 
 
 
3.2 Operator Research Objectives 
A subset of the collected data has been reviewed and is described below under the Operator topics 
from the Requirements/Best Practices table to highlight the key team observations and discussion 
during the flight tests. Field observers and the surveys focused on the four areas of the project matrix 
specified above in Table 4: 
• operator/training requirements 
• information requirements and reporting (information “in” and information “out”) 
• response time 
 
Reported here are recurring themes noted during field observations that relate to these four areas and 
were seen in, or reported by, multiple test sites. A summary for each category of observations, the 
debriefs, and some of the survey questions follows. Although the discussions are split into these four 
Operator categories, many of the points are not exclusive to the category in which they are 
mentioned. 
 
3.2.1 Qualifications—Operator and Training Requirements 
As part of a shakedown survey (“shakedown 1”), participants were asked five questions about their 
Remote-pilot (RPIC) and manned flight qualifications and experience. See Appendix 4 for a listing 
of these questions. Numbers of responses varied from 20 to 29 (out of 29 respondents to the survey) 
across these five questions. 
 
Participants in the field tests felt well prepared for the task; 23 respondents (out of 29) reported that 
they held a Part 107 remote pilot’s certificate (sUAS). However, note that the respondents varied in 
their role and not all of these personnel flew the UAS (i.e., were the PIC). Of 29 respondents, 17 
were not the PIC (54%) and 29% (9) were neither PIC nor GCSO. Respondents reported having 890 
hours (on average) of UAS flying time. There was one outlier respondent who reported three times 
as many hours as the next highest reporter. (If this outlier is removed m=530 hours.) On average, 
respondents reported having spent 729 hours-in-the-role they were working for the field test. Again, 
if the outlier is removed, the average number of hours-in-role reduces to 515. They also reported 
having spent 123 hours (on average) working with the vehicle they were using in the field test (see 
Appendix 4, Figure A4.1). 
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In addition, many of the participants held manned pilot certificates. Only a quarter of the 
respondents (7) said they they didn’t have any piloting certificates. Of those who did, 7 respondents 
(24%) said they held a private pilot’s license or were in the process of attaining one and 13 (44%) 
reported holding more than one certificate (see Appendix 4, Figure A4.2). On average, manned-
vehicle pilots reported having 2,003 manned flight hours (range 41–14,500). Taking just the 
respondents who said they were PIC in the national campaign flight tests (n=11), the mean number 
of manned flight hours per PIC increases to 2,944. 
 
Among the test sites, there was a wide range of past experience with UTM and managing airborne 
operations in a future UTM environment. These varied both within a test site and among all the test 
sites. The physical and social organization of the teams were also different, whereas some teams 
operated with a single USS Op/specialist for all operations and others with multiple USS Ops taking 
the workload for one operation each. Awareness of UTM was generally observed to be higher for 
the team when USS Ops were co-located with the flight crews. Knowledge of the UTM concept also 
varied between none and expert level, with USS Ops sometimes having less understanding than 
predicted. USS Ops sometimes did not know what information was available to them or who in the 
crew knew—or should know—which pieces of information. 
 
As training was ongoing throughout the flight tests, performance interacting with the USS client was 
observed to improve as roles were better defined over time. Depending on their background, 
different operators focused on different tools for situation awareness. Those with traditional aviation 
experience (or were long-term UAV pilots) were eyes-out (or on the ground station display) while 
those with a programming background were more likely to interact with UTM and to be informed 
about states and other information useful for situation awareness of their operation and others’. 
Procedures were often not firm at the start of the test. This also influenced teamwork/coordination. 
The flow of the tests was observed to improve as these elements improved. 
 
In debriefs, crews were asked to discuss what experience and qualifications a UAS flight crew 
should hold. From the debrief transcriptions, there were 50 direct comments that are described under 
six categories in Appendix 9. For examples of these comments, please see Table A9.1. Debrief 
participants also talked about operator requirements—the processes and methods they use when 
flying a UAS mission. From the debrief transcriptions, there were 81 direct operator requirement 
comments that are described under six categories in Table A9.5 in Appendix 9. 
 
When discussing qualifications to fly UAS, debrief participants underlined that, in their opinion, 
while the current qualification requirements (Part 107) were adequate for line-of-sight flying, for 
BVLOS flying an operator needs to have more skill and should be required to have more flight 
experience and probably a rating to indicate that. Operators discussed that BVLOS training could 
include time shadowing a more experienced pilot or flying practice sorties into congested airspace 
and BVLOS under the oversight of a mentor. They discussed that off-flight-line training (ground 
school) should include many of the aspects of private pilot ground school; for example, modules 
about the weather, communication, and terrain awareness. 
 
In regard to going out on missions, participants discussed the need to plan sorties beforehand, 
considering not only the desired flight route but also what contingency actions the crew would take 
if different problems arise along the way. They emphasized the importance of the entire flight crew 
team being “on the same page” and therefore how important it is to prepare the whole team (e.g., 
include in planning and briefings) for flights. Team members, other than the PIC, in addition to their 
role on the team contribute to the group’s situation awareness and PIC gave examples of instances 
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where knowing other flight crew-members had situation awareness or receiving regular 
communication from a flight team member was invaluable. PIC suggested that that their attention 
sometimes needs to be focused on the health of their vehicle and at these times they are relying on 
crewmembers to be aware of other aspects of the event unfolding. They also noted that, because 
unplanned events can occur at any time, UTM demands and USS interfaces should be designed to 
minimize PIC distraction. 
 
3.2.2 Information Requirements 
In a shakedown questionnaire and during the end of day survey, participants were asked five 
questions about where they looked during flights to gain information about their vehicle. See 
Appendix 5 for a listing of these questions. Numbers of responses varied from 24 to 45 (out of 155 
respondents to the end-of-day survey) and were 19 for the shakedown survey. 
 
Before taking part in the flight test, respondents estimated that they would look to other personnel 
(e.g., the GCSO or the USS Op) 75% of the time and look at displays about 25% of the time to 
gather information about their own vehicle, with talking via radio being the most frequently chosen 
option (n=14). It should be noted that the question options were uneven, as six personnel roles were 
listed but only three displays (see Figure A5.1 in Appendix 5). Most respondents reported seeking 
vehicle information from more than one source of information. After days when they had flown 
BVLOS missions, participants were asked a similar question. Again, most respondents reported 
looking at more than one source of information to keep track of their vehicle when it was BVLOS. 
On average, participants reported looking at three sources of information. About 27% of the time, 
respondents reported looking at their ground station display and talking to their VO to gather vehicle 
position information (Figure 4). The USS client display was the third most popular source of 
information, chosen 23 out of 135 times (17%) (mid-blue [lowest] blocks in every bar on Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Means by which survey respondents found information about their vehicle when it was 
flying BVLOS. Note: Due to a number of reasons, including those discussed in the 
“initial methodology adjustments” section, only participants from four sites answered 
this question.  
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Participants were asked the same question again in the context of acquiring information for 
altitude-stratified flights—although only four sites answered this question. Again, most 
respondents reported looking at more than one source of information to keep track of relative 
aircraft positions when their flight was altitude-stratified with another. On average, participants 
reported looking at two sources of information. About 25% of the time respondents reported 
looking at their mission planner display (GCS) and/or their USS client display (see Appendix 5, 
bars 1 and 2 on Figure A5.2). Looking into the airspace was the third most popular source of 
information, with 10 selections out of 53 being the sky. 
 
When asked questions about the process of finding information rather than the source of data, half 
of the respondents (16 of 32) reported they were “easily” able to find all the information they 
needed to support their decisions (Appendix 5, Figure A5.3). Only one respondent said they found 
it difficult to find information and three more said they had no displays (4 of 32, 12.5%)4. 
Comments supported these option selections but respondents often said that they gathered 
information from other people rather than displays, e.g., “all information was provided by my eyes, 
crew, and OC radio calls” (Test Site 2 participant). This also applies to their use of their USS 
client; a third of the time participants reported looking at the USS displays themselves and the 
other two thirds of the time they had other people report the USS client information to them. It 
should be noted that it depended on their role in the flight crew and whether they were reporting or 
being reported to. Additional verbal communications were required when the UTM Op was remote 
from the rest of the crew. 
 
In debriefs, operators were asked to discuss information that they would want to gain from their 
displays/tools and their team about their own flight and others. From the debrief transcriptions, there 
were 127 direct comments that are described under seven categories in Appendix 9. For examples of 
these comments, see Table A9.2. 
 
Crews noted in debriefs they wanted to be able to immediately see all aspects of their vehicle health, 
performance, and location. They also wanted to be able to find out location and health information 
about other flights in their vicinity. They were interested in receiving alerts about issues with their 
own vehicles and with others and some suggested that they wanted their USS to suggest courses of 
action, give an account of why issues arise, or how crews might recover from a situation. However, 
this is a substantial quantity of information and, along with the list of items they would like to know, 
crews noted occasions during the flight tests when they experienced both visual and aural clutter 
from their displays. There were concerns that too much data was available and that crews could not 
pay attention to all of it without being distracted. Although the amount of information that a crew 
was able to attend to depended to some extent on the size of the team, the debrief and observation 
comments suggest that information needs to be carefully prioritized and then layered within the tools 
available to ensure that the most pertinent information is the most readily available but all 
information could be obtained if needed. 
 
To facilitate safe and efficient operations, flight crews needed fast access to easily understandable 
information about the current mission, nearby operations, and the surrounding environment. When 
available, situation displays were used by crews for awareness and decision-making. Some feedback 
suggested that crews sometimes struggled to extract the information they needed from the displays 
they used in the flight tests—sometimes information was buried too deeply in the tool given the time 
                                               
4 Absence of a visual display does not mean that the participant received no information, as many flight crews 
were designed to receive information via voice. 
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available and other activities occurring; other times messages were difficult to interpret. Some 
information participants said they just did not need, although opinion was divided on this. When the 
information displayed was perceived as unreliable, its usefulness was diminished as operators lost 
trust and sought out alternate information sources. For example, observers at different sites noted 
instances of multiple sources for position data showing conflicting information at the same time. 
Crews considered not just what information they would like to receive but also how it is presented. 
Many teams liked audio presentation of messages, emphasizing that messages need to be simply 
worded and that audio presentation should be used selectively. They also noted that the 
environmental conditions in the field sometimes make visual displays challenging to use. 
 
Hindrances to information being exchanged were observed in two ways. Firstly, network 
connectivity issues caused problems with information being sent to UTM. Some connection issues 
identified include: signals from vehicles being interrupted by structures; radio interference; weak 
LTE cellular connections; slow (ADS-B) data exchange rates; weak wifi signals; unexplained “dead 
zones”; pauses during in-flight resubmissions; RF interference; and signal scramblers. There were 
also less clear connectivity issues from the USS to UTM. 
 
Human error when inputting information was also observed at nearly all the test sites. For example, 
when a flight plan was modified at the last minute, sometimes the corresponding adjustments were 
not made to the volumes so although the volume submissions were valid they no longer reflected the 
planned flight—resulting in non-conforming and rogue states. Additionally, operators sometimes 
neglected to reflect changes in their planned or current flight within UTM. This may be a reflection 
of an operator’s familiarity working within the UTM environment. Calculation errors for appropriate 
volume altitudes and time-length of segments also caused issues during submission and during 
flight. The submission process in general was sometimes hindered by environmental conditions such 
as noise, sun, or glare around the USS operator. 
 
3.2.3 Reporting 
In debriefs, operators were asked to discuss information that they would want to send out to other 
operations and what they thought should be required to be broadcast. From the debrief 
transcriptions, there were 24 direct comments that were gathered under four categories. For 
examples of these comments see Table A9.3 in Appendix 9. 
 
Crews were keen to share as much information as possible with support personnel, or “home base,” 
suggesting streaming raw data from their vehicle to these locations. They noted that consistency/ 
standardization of information and formatting on a USS GUI is needed for these remote personnel 
(including the USS Operator when s/he is managing a number of flights from a central location) to 
be able to compare across—and understand—the multiple flights they are likely to be managing. 
The information that operators felt they should broadcast to others concerned off nominal vehicle 
states rather than nominal data. This was echoed in the observational data collected. Operators at one 
site suggested flight crews should have to broadcast low battery states, loss of connectivity, needing 
to land immediately, and other unplanned vehicle states (Appendix A9.3). Other discussions restated 
that a USS needs to transmit, or report out, off-nominal events occurring with a user’s own operation 
or a nearby operation, such as non-conforming or rogue states, lost links, return-to-base (RTB), and 
RTB procedures or intent. However, interviewees emphasized that the community needs to agree on 
the terminology for each of the states that is broadcast to ensure that everyone broadcasts the same 
message for the same state. They also noted that the terms should be straight forward, not confusing, 
and should not conflict with current aviation terminology. Another point crews made about 
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broadcasting off-nominal states is that the crews themselves cannot be required to send these 
messages since they will be too busy managing the event. This suggests that off-nominal 
information broadcasts through USS clients will need to be automatically triggered. 
 
Beyond the need to share off-nominal situations, however, the factors that contribute to when, or 
whether, this information is shared were not widely agreed upon nor was whether to share contact 
information for those non-conforming operations. Sharing position reporting was also not widely 
agreed upon, with some operators wanting access to all positions of all nearby vehicles all the time, 
and other users only wanting access to (or to share their own position) during off-nominal situations 
that breach a geo-fence (see Table 9.3 in Appendix 9 for more examples). Operators expressed that 
they may like to know if their own or a nearby vehicle was operating near its endurance limits so 
they may begin to plan for a contingency. For planning purposes, operators generally thought it 
would be helpful to see the volumes of existing accepted operations in their vicinity before they 
submit their own to UTM. 
 
In shakedown questions and during the end-of-day survey, participants were asked four questions 
about where they looked to acquire information about other vehicles. See Appendix 6 for a listing of 
these questions. The assumption for these questions is that if flight crews are looking for this 
information about other vehicles then other vehicles and USS clients should be reporting these data 
because it is what the community wants to know. Numbers of responses varied from 24 to 47 (out of 
155 respondents to the end-of-day survey) and there were 16 respondents for the shakedown survey. 
 
Before taking part in the flight test, respondents estimated that they would look to other personnel 
(e.g., the GCSO or the UTM Op) for information 63% of the time and look at displays about 19% of 
the time to gather information about other vehicles in the area, with talking via radio being the most 
frequently chosen option (n=14)5 (see Figure A6.1 in Appendix 6). Most respondents reported 
seeking vehicle information from more than one source. They reported they intended to look for the 
potential locations of other vehicles during their flight planning whereas, while their vehicle was 
airborne, they intended to only seek out information about other flights if they could see and/or hear 
this other vehicle in the vicinity. However, participants reported a slightly different approach in their 
end-of-day surveys where 30% of the time they looked for other vehicles on their displays “all the 
time” (see Appendix 6, Figure A6.2). In their general comments, participants from two sites noted 
that they would have liked to have more information available to them about other vehicles. 
 
3.2.4 Response Time 
In debriefs, operators were asked to discuss what they thought would be an appropriate response 
time to a UTM notification and what factors would influence their answer. From the debrief 
transcriptions, there were 65 direct comments under six categories (see Table A9.4 in Appendix 9). 
 
Crew comments about response times to non-nominal behavior from their vehicles varied from 
“seconds” to “a minute or two” until an appropriate action could or should be taken. They further 
expanded that this variation in response-time estimation depended on several factors, including 
platform capability, procedures, and the level of automation. For example, although a multirotor 
UAV could change course and complete an action more quickly than a fixed wing UAV, the 
potentially faster and less maneuverable fixed wing would be more critical to address quickly. 
                                               
5 Note that the question options were uneven, as six personnel roles were listed but only two displays. 
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Crews working with more capable automation, especially during dense operations or when 
managing a fleet, could have shorter response times without as much human involvement. 
 
On a similar note, operator decision making and their attention, situation awareness, and workload 
were frequently cited as factors. Response time is closely connected to experience with UTM, 
familiarity with sources of information, the usability of those sources, and team organization. 
Training and familiarity with UTM and the types of information the USS client provided was not 
equal among operators. Often those flying the vehicles had limited or no direct access to UTM 
information. If they did, their knowledge was often not enough to diagnose and plan a response 
without the aid of a USS specialist. Team organization, specifically the location of the team 
members, was observed to affect response times. If the USS Op was co-located with the flight 
crews, actions could be taken more quickly than if the USS Op was remote. In hub-and-spoke (or 
remote) teams, the ratio of USS Ops to GCS/PICs was uneven, with one USS Op managing multiple 
operations. This meant that the UTM knowledge resource was often pre-occupied when multiple 
issues with a scenario needed attention. When USS Ops were responsible for overseeing multiple 
simultaneous flights and had high workload, this lengthened their observed response times to USS 
messages. The usability of the client interfaces also impacted response time. 
 
If only relevant information was shown, it was easier for operators to diagnose an issue. Conversely, 
if there was clutter, the operator could be overwhelmed with irrelevant messages while trying to 
diagnose a particular issue. Consistency with units of measurement was also noted to both create 
problems with submissions and creating proper solutions. Operators would spend extra time double-
checking that they were using the correct measurements. Observers noted that poor USS information 
usability was associated with frustration and longer times to read, diagnose, and prescribe solutions 
to incoming USS messages. 
 
Participants were asked three questions about the speed of responses from and to the UTM system. 
Numbers of responses were lower for questions like these that were placed later in the survey and 
varied from 6 to 12. Participants from Test Site 4 rated the time to plan a new volume during flight 
as 4.6 out of 7 (“somewhat acceptable”) on average. Participants from Test Site 6 rated the time to 
plan a new volume during flight as 7 (“very acceptable”) on average. Participants from Test Site 4 
were more positive about dynamic re-planning, rating the time to submit a new volume during flight 
as 5 (“quite acceptable”) on average. Participants from Test Site 6 rated the time to submit a new 
volume during flight as 6 (“acceptable”) on average. On average, participants at two sites thought 
the USS alerted them to their potential geo-fence breach in a “quite timely” manner (m=4.72) (see 
Figure A7.1 in Appendix 7) and respondents from three sites thought this notification “moderately 
focused (grabbed)” their attention (m=4.41). 
 
3.3 Looking to the Future 
The debriefs brought to light interesting discussions on topics outside our main categories. These 
topics are more forward thinking and address concerns and suggestions by operators for what the 
UTM architecture might look like in the future (see Appendix 9, Table A9.7). 
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3.3.1 UTM Feature Suggestion/Implementation 
From debrief discussions, it is apparent that operators understand the positive effects that segmented 
operations have on airspace efficiency; however, the process and complexity of the timing and 
sequencing of volumes can be a barrier to operation success due to the static nature of these 
components. It is suggested that time within a segment be more dynamic and possibly integrate a 
level of intelligence that can allocate segmented space based on a vehicles trajectory (see table A9.6 
for more details). This could possibly alleviate crew workload and coordination while increasing 
flexibility when operations are expected to occupy the same space in a small time window. 
 
3.3.2 Future/Forward Looking (Includes Equipage, USS Features, Fleet Ops) 
One of the topics discussed in the debriefs is aimed at future operations and this bred conversation 
on how operators envision a future with UTM. Feedback ranged from essential vehicle 
equipage/cooperation to USS features to fleet operations, all of which play a role in the difficulties 
that could arise from denser operations. 
 
3.3.3 Emergency Ops 
Emergency operations and the general need for sharing of airspace and assets raise comments on 
how UTM could handle these situations in the future. It is clear that there will be a need to quickly 
allocate airspace for these priority missions and dynamically allow for multiple assets to be 
integrated on the fly. This includes a portal by which a vehicle’s priority can shift as needed as well 
as a means to communicate with nearby operators should additional support be necessary. 
 
 
4.0 Discussion 
4.1 A Look Back at the TCL2 Demonstration 
The field test prior to the TCL2nc was a TCL2 demonstration that was conducted in October 2016 at 
the Reno-Stead Airport in Reno, Nevada. Afterwards, Johnson, et al. (2017) reported on the 
activities and findings from this test and identified four key findings. Those key findings are listed 
here for reference, followed by a reflection of their relevance during the TCL2nc. 
 
Key Finding 1. “The UTM research platform provided key information needed by operators to 
successfully conduct missions… .” Johnson, et al. notes that UASs are currently operating in 
sparsely used airspace and operators are not always aware of other operations planned in the area 
without direct coordination. 
 
During the TCL2nc, this Key Finding 1 was observed to be still the case—UAS pilots are not 
accustomed to other UAS vehicles being in or around the airspace they want to occupy but advances 
were made in raising awareness during the TCL2nc. Johnson, et al. (2017) made the 
recommendation that operators should display airspace information and have access to information 
from other operators. This recommendation was not met by all sites in the National Campaign for 
two reasons—either philosophical reasons that the team did not want to share their information or 
practical reasons that the USS client did not have this level of display. 
 
Key Finding 2. Measurement and reporting of vehicle altitude was not consistent among airspace 
users. Johnson, et al. noted that “…differences in measuring altitude can pose hazards to the UAS, 
airspace, or obstacles... .” 
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Key Finding 2 was also observed to be still the case during the TCL2nc. In one example, two 
sensors for measuring altitude on one vehicle showed different heights, reporting the vehicle as 
simultaneously both rogue and not rogue in UTM terms, depending on which display/reporting tool 
was read. Johnson, et al. (2017) made the recommendation, which still holds, that altitude reporting 
should be consistent or translatable across airspace users. 
 
Key Finding 3. The sources of weather information for the Reno 2016 flight test were inadequate to 
support BVLOS operations. The paper notes “…significant variability in observed weather based on 
location exposed a hazard for BVLOS operations...poor awareness of the localized weather 
conditions... .” 
 
In the TCL2nc, crews were much more aware of their local weather. This is due both to better 
knowledge of the microclimates in their own test areas and having access to “home-base” weather 
sensors and also, for those who participated in TCL2, having more awareness of the potential effects 
of the environment on their vehicles. The increased awareness of local weather led to fewer flight 
days being flown than originally planned but most test sites had scheduled extra test days to 
accommodate this. Although the recommendation from Johnson, et al. (2017) that weather 
information sources should be augmented with GCS and UAS reports and shared with other airspace 
users, it wasn’t fully implemented during the TCL2nc, the test sites were working towards this. The 
recommendation from Johnson, et al. (2017) that BVLOS operations should not conduct altitude-
stratified operations unless there is accurate relative position information shared between UAS, it 
was not fully implemented and tested and therefore still applies. Although most test sites were able 
to share relative position information to the flight crews by way of their USS displays (albeit relayed 
by voice in some cases), the above discussion regarding disparate altitude measurements suggest 
more research is still needed. 
 
Key Finding 4. Operational plans were not always consistent between the UTM system, GCS, and 
UAS. Johnson, et al. (2017) noted “of the 35 flights…46% left their flight geography.” 
 
This Key Finding was an area of huge improvement for the TCL2nc. Most test sites learned from 
participating in the TCL2 demonstration in Reno and through having to plan their flights themselves 
and, as a result, they developed volumes within which their vehicles were able to stay. Take-off 
volumes were observed to be larger so the ‘rogue-on-take-off’ issue happened rarely in the TCL2nc. 
However, volume construction/management was still a learning point. The recommendation from 
Johnson et al. (2017) that flight trajectories should be contained within geo-fence boundaries was 
well understood by partners but some found that achieving this is not as straightforward as it sounds. 
In addition, the recommendation that the aircraft enforce the geo-fence boundary was only partially 
achieved because some vehicles do not have software that permits boundary configuration beyond 
setting a radius. 
 
Participants in the TCL2nc made improvements in the areas of all five recommendations from the 
Johnson, et al. (2017) paper but in order to complete the TCL2nc tests with the resources available 
some of those recommendations weren’t addressed as extensively as were others. 
 
4.2 Observations from Test Site Partners and NASA Researchers 
At the end of their TCL2nc final reports, test sites completed a discussion section that included 
general observations, findings, and a summary of their experiences from the TCL2nc. NASA 
researchers summarized their notes in a similar way which were compared against the TCL2nc final 
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reports from the test sites. Where more than one test site and/or the NASA researchers made a 
similar point, those observations are listed and discussed below. 
 
In general, test sites seem to have had experience running their first UTM flight tests and many of 
their take-aways reflect similar points to those made by Mercer & Homola (2017). For example, the 
test sites recognized that fixed-wing vehicles have different performance characteristics from multi-
rotor vehicles and need larger volumes, especially for take-off. Also, they were keenly aware of how 
environmental conditions can affect flights. However, these issues should not be dismissed; rather, it 
indicates some of the findings from Reno in 2016 are still relevant. 
 
Situation Awareness: When pilots or GCSOs lost sight of their vehicle they relied on other sources 
to maintain their situation awareness. Often this was through a USS Op. If the USS Op was not co-
located or busy, relevant UTM information was sometimes slow to filter down to the flight crew. 
When the pilot or GCSO had access to UTM information, the usability of the information was often 
poor and frustrating to use for the untrained/unfamiliar operator—to the point of being largely 
ignored. This meant that operator situation awareness during critical phases of flight (such as flying 
BVLOS or altitude-stratified) was often limited. Additionally, communication links to the vehicle 
were also observed to be an issue while BVLOS, either due to physical obstructions or poor 
LTE/wi-fi connections. 
 
USS Client Messages: Some UTM system messages did not contain enough information for the user 
to quickly diagnose a problem and make a decision about how to remedy it. These issues occurred 
rarely because scenarios were scripted (and, in general, nothing was a surprise). While it is not 
within the project’s remit to specify USS client interface features, more research is required to define 
“usable” information for such displays. 
 
Focus on UTM: The Airspace Operations Lab observers noted that, at times, test sites seemed more 
focused on flying their vehicles than on testing the UTM concept and on completing a test scenario 
rather than exercising their USS(s). One reason for this was that some partners had purchased new 
vehicles for the flight test and were still “getting to know” how they worked. A second and more 
significant reason was that the flight crews had less direct exposure to UTM, which resulted in a 
lower commitment to exercise the UTM concept and a lower level of situation awareness in the 
field. Another reason was a lack of time to train some members of the team on the UTM concept. In 
more than one location, only a few of the test site personnel were familiar with UTM at the start of 
the field testing, with the other members of the team focused on flying. This level of understanding 
affected data collection as many participants were unable to provide comments on their usage of and 
experience with UTM. 
 
Accurate and Complete Data Reporting: Many test sites weren’t able to obtain complete data 
coverage using the sensors they had planned, had poor cellular coverage, or had telemetry “dead 
spots” in their test area due to RF interference or unknown causes. Some test sites solved this issue 
by relaying information using different media. Others noted discrepancies in their telemetry data, as 
in the example above, wherein two altitude-reporting sensors that fed different tools (GCS vs. USS) 
disagreed over the altitude of the vehicle. Another test site stated that “These items must be taken 
into account during planning of UTM missions so that they do not introduce flight safety concerns.” 
A third, related area, was that in teams where the USS Op was situated away from the flight-crews, 
and USS ‘relay displays’ were available to them, NASA researchers noted that on occasion the 
displays were showing different information. This caused issues because the “truth” was different 
for different flight-crew members. However, not all issues necessarily originated at the test sites. In 
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debriefs, participants commented that Simple Text Orienting Messaging Protocol (STOMP) seemed 
to work only intermittently during some days (Appendix 9, Table A9.6) and that some rogue 
notifications seemed spurious. 
 
Standardization: Because of the wide variety of vehicle platforms available today, the effort to 
connect vehicles to UTM was substantial for some partners and resulted in abandoning some 
vehicles or dropping them from their test plans part-way through the TCL2nc. Some guidance on 
vehicles known to have been difficult to integrate may help future partners. A related concern is the 
time and effort flight crews spent translating units for flight parameters between systems that use 
different units. The potentially negative consequences of not standardizing units are well 
documented in the domain of manned aviation. 
 
Setting Expectations: Many of the take-aways outlined in the test sites’ summaries concerned their 
interactions with NASA. Appendix 8 lists some of the points test sites made, so as to help improve 
future field test activities. Partner expectations of the TCL2nc were slightly different from those of 
NASA, creating a learning process for both the partners and NASA. In general, partners found that 
preparing for their field test required more effort (took more man-hours) than they expected and was 
associated with more interactions with NASA Ames Research Center than they expected. This was 
also noted internally by NASA and the upcoming TCL3 effort is being planned with a schedule to 
address these comments, where test sites are able to select their test dates within a six-month period, 
allowing for—as requested—longer “spool up” and “spool down” times. Furthermore, any 
additional considerations from NASA to improve the efficiency of the interactions with partners 
would be well received. 
 
4.3 Recommendations 
From the discussions above, some suggestions and recommendations were extracted from the 
TCL2nc. While the main points of these recommendations apply to all those involved with UTM, 
the recommendations are written looking ahead to TCL3 and future flight tests in particular. 
Focusing solely on TCL3, those to whom these points may be applicable are listed in Table 6. 
 
• Users participating in flights operating in a UTM environment should be familiar with the UTM 
concept and the kind of information that is exchanged or available. When operators had a firm 
understanding of the UTM concept and had general operational experience, there was an observed 
benefit for performance. Highly functioning crews need good coordination and teamwork, 
including the definition of roles and responsibilities and advanced planning and checklists. 
Another recommendation is to conduct training sessions before flight tests to familiarize 
participants with UTM and the UTM objectives of the flight tests. 
 
• Further investigate whether training/experience requirements should differ based on the 
responsibilities associated with an operator’s specific tasks. Operator roles were not all created 
equally and the associated responsibilities depended largely on the team structure. In some cases, 
an operator had no interaction at all with UTM, such as a PIC who was not at the same station as 
the USS Op. If a PIC had no interaction with UTM then the corresponding training or knowledge 
required to fly might be less than a PIC who also acts as GCSO and USS Op regularly interacting 
with UTM. However, UTM is currently benefitting from many in the field having knowledge from 
manned aviation. Some of the training required to obtain a manned aviation certificate (e.g., 
weather assessment, radio communication protocols, etc.) need to be investigated and potentially 
added to obtain UAS certification. 
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• Team organization should allow easy dissemination of information between operators and ensure 
there are enough operators filling a role to avoid unmanageably high workload. In general, there 
were not enough USS Ops with expertise to handle the amount of operational demand, especially 
when the line of communication to other operators was cumbersome or disrupted. 
 
• UTM interfaces should help users of all experience levels perform their tasks with more efficiency 
and fewer errors through the use of automation and tools. Frustration with UTM and UTM 
interfaces—or operators not using their USS client to its full potential—could be attributed to 
either the UTM/USS system or the operator but is likely the responsibility of both. When solely 
viewed through the lens of operator requirements, one could incorrectly conclude that the errors 
seen in the tests could be mitigated for future tests with more rigorous training or more stringent 
procedures. However, it may be more effective if there is system automation implemented to help 
operators of all experience levels perform their tasks and procedures are more formalized. 
 
• Include cross-check procedures (automated or human) for submissions and telemetry calibration 
as part of the preflight checklist. Emphasize the importance of equipment calibration for accuracy 
in telemetry reporting. This may mitigate human error when submitting information into UTM and 
also help teams focus on contributing to the UTM objectives of their testing. 
 
• Secure reliable connectivity during shakedowns (or knowing the weak points and avoiding them 
during testing). This may help teams focus on their interactions with UTM by reducing the 
frequency with which they need to troubleshoot their connections. Research procedures that are 
robust to potential telemetry ‘dead spots’ that vehicles may fly through, and research to better 
understand RF interference, offer possible mitigations. 
 
• The information shown on situation displays should be from a reliable source. Without this, the 
operator can lose trust in the information and its perceived usefulness can be diminished. 
 
• Standardize units of measurement (e.g., meters vs. feet and knots vs. mph) both on vehicles and on 
USS displays. Also standardize USS terminology. 
 
• Streamline the NASA-partner interaction. Improve the efficiency of NASA requests to partners 
during flight-test preparation. This could include clarifying data collection methods and 
expectations for data collection well in advance, expanding software check-out sessions for each 
test site to involve UTM concept training, discussing test methods, and simulating partners’ 
suggested scenarios (with full-USS interaction). Establish clear definitions of what 
accomplishments are expected in a given test scenario and then define a short set of success 
criteria for each contributing vehicle that could be used to quickly determine whether the key 
UTM goals have been met. Set communication protocols for what flight-crew members are 
expected to be reporting on SLACK, so that those communications do not occupy flight crews 
during a flight. 
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Table 6. Flight Test Participants and Recommendations 
  Partners Test Participants 
NASA 
Project Researchers Others 
R1a Users participating in flights 
operating in a UTM environment 
should be familiar with the UTM 
concept and the kind of 
information that is exchanged or 
available. 
✔ ✔   
 
R1b Conduct UTM training sessions. ✔ ✔ ✔   
R2 Further investigate whether 
training/experience requirements 
should differ based on the 
responsibilities associated with an 
operator’s specific tasks. 
   ✔ 
 
R3 Team organization should allow 
easy dissemination of information 
between operators and ensure 
there are enough operators filling 
a role to avoid unmanageably 
high workload. 
✔ ✔  ✔ 
 
R4 UTM interfaces should help users 
of all experience levels perform 
their tasks with more efficiency 
and fewer errors through the use 
of automation and tools. 
✔ ✔  ✔ 
Developers? 
R5 Include cross-check procedures 
(automated or human) for 
submissions and telemetry 
calibration as part of the pre-flight 
checklist. 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
NASA test 
team 
R6 Secure reliable connectivity 
during shakedowns (or knowing 
the weak points and avoiding 
them during testing). 
✔ ✔ ✔  
NASA test 
team 
R7 The information shown on 
situation displays should be from 
a reliable source. 
✔ ✔  ✔ 
 
R8 Standardize units of measurement 
and terminology. ✔    
Manufacturers, 
developers 
R9 Streamline the NASA-partner 
interaction. ✔  ✔  
 
  
  
22 
5.0 Conclusions 
Six test sites participated in the TCL2nc duirng May and June 2017. The data discussed above came 
from on-site and remote NASA researchers for each test site, end-of-day debriefs, post-flight and 
end-of-day questionnaires, and data submitted as part of the data management plan. The TCL2nc 
flight tests were a great success and much was learned about operator, information, and response 
time requirements in a TCL2 environment. Test sites made improvements in the areas of all five 
recommendations from the Johnson, et al. (2017) paper but in order to complete the TCL2nc tests 
with the resources available some of those recommendations were not addressed as extensively as 
others. 
 
• Data showed that teams were well qualified on paper, in terms of both completed training and 
having experience with flying UAS vehicles. However, the understanding and experience of UTM 
was much lower across the flight crews which affected their interactions with UTM and, 
ultimately, the collected data. Crews indicated that qualifications or experience requirements may 
have to increase for those who want to fly BVLOS. 
 
• Overall, teams examined a variety of sources for information, including the USS displays. The 
usability of the displays themselves determined, to an extent, what operators looked at or listened 
to while quality of information was also variable and influenced crew usage. In addition, there 
were some issues that either prevented information from getting to flight crews or corrupted the 
information en route. 
 
• Over the course of the flight tests, participants increasingly understood the need to be aware of 
other vehicles. With respect to reporting requirements, a problem arose in that some partners 
preferred not to report-out information that they considered private/proprietary but at the same 
time they wanted to receive this information from others because they recognized they needed it to 
form their own situation awareness of the airspace environment. Most partners agreed that 
providing information to build the situation awareness of the community is valuable. 
 
• Operator response time (i.e., in units of seconds) was not assessed as part of the observations and 
surveys. Crews noted that response time in terms of vehicle maneuvering depends heavily on the 
vehicle itself. Participants reported that for some procedures, interacting through their USS took an 
acceptable amount of time. Observations found that a flight crew’s time to respond to a UTM 
notification depended heavily on the team’s structure, communication efficiency, and procedures. 
 
• Individual training, team organization, preparedness, and UTM understanding all influenced the 
information required and accessed by the operators, as well as their response times. Future tests 
should continue to investigate these factors as research transitions to the more complex TCL3 and 
TCL4 environments. 
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Appendix 1. Test-site Flying Days for the National Campaign 
 
Table A1.1. Test-site Fying Days for the TCL2nc 
Flying weeks Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
May 15–19  May 15, 16, 
18 
May 15, 18, 19 May 17–19   
May 22–26 May 24, 25 May 23, 26  May 23–24 
May 25,26 
  
May 29–June 2 May 31–
June 2 
May 30–
June 2 
  May 31–
June 2 
June 1, 2 
June 5–9 June 5, 6, 9 June 5, 7 June 5, 8  June 6–8 June 6 
Number of 
shakedown days 5 5 3 5 3 2 
Number of data-
collection days 3 6 2 2 3 1 
Number of planned 
test days 5 8 3 2 4 2 
 
Key: orange background to text = a shakedown day; green background to text = a data-collection 
day 
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Appendix 2. GCS and Flight-crew Information 
 
Table A2.1. GCS and Flight-crew Information 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Most common 
number of GCS 
3 
(with 4 crews) 
5 1-2 
(with up to 4 
crews) 
2 
(with 4 
crews) 
3 3 
Number of 
scenarios 
2 
(with 
variations) 
4 
(with one 
crew flying 
only 1 
scenario) 
6 
(with 
variations) 
1 
(with 
variations) 
3 1 
Number of 
organizations 
flying 
2 
(to make 4 
crews) 
5 2 
(to make 4 
crews) 
4 2 3 
Most common 
number of 
personnel in a 
flight crew 
4 
(not co-
located) 
12 
(co-located) 
4-6 
(not co-
located) 
2 
(not co-
located) 
3 3 
(not co-
located) 
1 or 2 
(not co-
located with 
USS Op) 
Common crew 
positions 
GCSO, PIC, 
Launch Eng, 
USS Op 
 GCSO/PIC/ 
USS Op, 
Launch Eng 
(UTM 
manager) 
GCSO, 
PIC, USS 
Op, Comms 
GCSO, PIC, 
USS Op 
GCSO, PIC, 
or 
GCSO/PIC 
Additional crew 
positions 
VO for every 
crew +2, 
Mission 
Manager, USS 
Manager, 
Video 
Engineer 
Mission 
Manager + 
helper, VO, 
Range 
Safety 
Officer 
Mission 
Manager, +2 
VO (total) 
 Radar Team, 
Police 
Department 
 
. 
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Table A2.2. Vehicle and Flight-crew Information 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Vehicle-PIC 
pairing 
consistent 
through test 
No 
3 of 5 were 
consistent 
No No, 
mostly but not 
all 
Yes Yes No 
1 of 3 was 
consistent 
vs. 
Yes 
PIC-rest of 
crew pairing 
consistent 
through test 
No 
2 of 4 GCSO 
changed, 
other 
personnel 
rotated 
Yes No, 
mostly but not 
all 
Yes No Yes 
Same vehicle 
type used for 
same mission 
Yes Yes No, 
mostly but not 
all 
No Yes Yes 
Vehicle flew 
from same 
location within 
a scenario 
Yes Yes No No No, 
changed 
with 
scenario 
Yes 
Number of 
flights per PIC-
vehicle 
combination 
5, 2, 7, 2, 5, 
2, 2, 2 
(5 cannot 
account for) 
N/A N/A 2 x (2 to 4) x 3 
approximately 
9 ? 
Number of 
flights per 
vehicle-GCS 
combination 
4, 2, 1, 5, 2, 
2, 2, 5, 2, 1, 
2 
3 x 2 x 5 
approximately 
4 x 4 x 2 
approximately 
2 x 3 x 3 
approximately 
3 ? 
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Appendix 3. Vehicles Flown in Flight Test 
 
Table A3.1. Flying-vehicle Information for the TCL2nc 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Number of UAS 
models 5 4 4 5 4 5 
Type of UAS 
flown 
5 multi-rotor 1 multi-rotor 
3 fixed-wing 
1 hybrid 
3 multi-rotor 
1 hybrid 
1 multi-rotor 
3 fixed-wing 
2 multi-rotor 
2 fixed-wing 
1 hybrid 
3 multi-rotor 
1 fixed-wing 
PIC employers 1 5 1 3 1 3 
GCSO 
employers 
1 5 1 3 1 3 
 
 
Note 1: Partners did not always fly the aircraft that they had planned to fly during the test for a 
variety of reasons, e.g., due to software mismatches, or mechanical difficulties, or other events. 
 
Note 2: For rows 3 and 4, “employers” indicates the number of separate business entities 
(companies) that people in these roles were employed with at that site. E.g., at Test-Site 1, one 
business provided the pilots for all the vehicles, at Test-Site 6, three different companies provided 
personnel to fly the vehicles they own and brought to the test. 
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Appendix 4. Qualifications, Survey Questions and Responses 
Q4. Do you have a remote pilot certificate with a sUAS rating (small Unmanned Aerial System)? 
Q5. How much experience (number of hours) do you have operating in the role you have for this 
flight test? 
Q6. How many flight hours do you have with the vehicle you are operating today? 
Q7. Do you have any manned aviation certifications? Please check all that you hold. 
Q8. How many hours do you have as PIC of a manned aircraft? 
 
 
Figure A4.1. Experience with operating UAS in terms of hours flying, hours in role, and working 
with a specific vehicle (n=22). 
 
 
Figure A4.2. Manned flight certificates held by respondents (n=29). Note pilots often only cite their 
highest certificate.  
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Appendix 5.  Information Requirements, Survey Questions and 
Responses 
 
S-Q4: Which displays do you look at and/ or people do you talk to, to find out information about 
your vehicle? 
 
S-Q8: How was UTM information relayed to you? 
 
BVLOS3: How did you acquire position information when your vehicle was flying operations 
beyond the pilot’s line of sight? 
 
AS1: How did you acquire relative position information when your vehicle was flying in stratified 
operations with another? 
 
R2A5: Were you able to find the information you needed to support your decisions about actions 
you needed to take as you were flying in the direction of another vehicle? E.g., head on, overtake. 
Please note which displays you used. 
 
 
 
Figure A5.1. Source of own-vehicle information as estimated by participants before their flight 
tests (n=19). 
 
 
Comparing the two sets of survey responses (Figure 6 versus Figure A5.1) shows a shift from 
participants thinking they would talk to others more often to looking at displays more often. It must 
be noted, though, that the options between the two questions are different and the shakedown survey 
offered many more roles while the end of day survey offered many more displays/tools. 
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Figure A5.2. Source of position information for altitude stratified flights (n=24). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5.3. Ease of finding information to support action decisions (n=32.) 
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Appendix 6.  Reporting, Survey Questions and Responses 
 
S-Q5: When do you actively seek out information about other flights? 
 
S-Q6: Which displays do you look at and/ or people do you talk to, to find out information about 
other nearby vehicles? 
 
MV1: How often did you check for other operations as you were flying your mission? 
 
SnA1: Please rate your level of awareness of the other vehicles that were flying close to yours in this 
mission. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6.1. Source of other-vehicle information as estimated by participants before their 
flight tests (n=16). 
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Figure A6.2. Displays that participants used to check for other vehicles in the vicinity (n=31-24). 
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Appendix 7. Response Time, Survey Questions and Responses 
 
DRP1 & DRP3: How efficient (in terms of time elapsed) was your flight planning and volume 
submission for your redirected (second) mission area? 
 
GCM1: Did the USS client alert you to a potential geo-fence breach in a timely manner? 
 
FTP12: Did the indication of your vehicle state as “nonconforming” show in time for your team to 
react and prevent your vehicle from moving into a “rogue” state? 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7.1.  Geo-fence management: timeliness of alerting and attention focusing (n=11, 12). 
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Appendix 8. Partner Feedback on General TCL2nc Conduct 
As noted above in the Observations section, partner expectations of the TCL2nc were slightly 
different from those of NASA. Much of the feedback that the test-sites outlined in their summaries 
concerned their interactions with NASA, or the “methods” of the field test. Listed below are some of 
the points test-sites made, so as to help improve future field test activities. 
 
Depth of checkouts: One of the areas of flight-test preparation that many sites noted they did not feel 
they had time to adequately complete was the USS client system checkout process. For example, 
Test-Site 2 said “additional time for connectivity checks was required.” Test-Site 6 said “There is 
need for a more well defined and structured USS checkout process since some issues slipped 
through the last checkout process and didn’t come to light till during the National Campaign.” 
Others just noted that they did not have enough preparation time. Additionally, AOL observers noted 
that while the pre-testing exercised the functionality of the partner USS systems, it did not put the 
systems under load. This meant that the tests showed only that tools were working and not that they 
were able to perform for the duration and complexity of the planned flight test(s). 
 
More structure: Partners found some of the flexibility of the national campaign difficult to 
accommodate, for example some documents (e.g., the FIMS specification documents) continued to 
evolve and change in the weeks leading up to the start of TCL2nc. Also, conditions and types of 
operations to be completed were clarified by NASA during the preparation time (and new 
documents were sent out throughout), but when these did not match with partners’ plans, changes to 
plans then had to be accommodated. Partners recommended that for future flight tests, it would 
benefit both industry and NASA to have a lock down date for documents, flight test specifications 
and requirements, and for NASA to provide templates well in advance for documents that the project 
requires. They felt this would aid in developing and testing all required functionality that NASA and 
the UAS Test-Site would like to demonstrate. 
 
Definition of criteria: A second source of flexibility that partners and AOL observers found difficult 
to accommodate was the lack of exit criteria specified for flight tests. More than one site, when 
flights were completed but did not go entirely to plan, was unsure whether they had met the 
exit/success criteria for that flight. 
 
Adherence to scenarios: Conversely, some sites used the lack of definition of success or exit criteria 
to change their flight scenarios or flight plans. This impacted data collection as some of the data 
collection tools (the survey, in particular) had been tailored to the specific scenarios that were 
outlined in test plans and a change in scenario meant data could not be collected. 
 
Site set up: Tied in to more than one of the points above is the observation that some sites were still 
shaking down their flight tests or installing/configuring equipment while they were collecting data. 
Scheduling: Some sites planned for their shakedown days to be adjacent to flight test days. This 
saved on expenses of set up and tear down but moving straight from shakedown to test did not leave 
any time for the team to fix flaws found in equipment, or with test plans, before they needed to move 
onto data collection. 
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Appendix 9. Categorization of Debrief Topics and Examples 
Key: 
Site = number of test-sites who discussed this topic (out of 6) 
Com. = number of comments coded under this topic 
 
Table A9.1.  Qualifications 
Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Experience you need 
to fly as a crew 
3 
 
 
18 You need to have a certain amount of experience, but I think there needs to 
be some of that demonstrated BVLOS, in certain situations, maybe adverse 
conditions...instead of flat out saying you need 100 hours. 
 
Not a quote but a list of items mentioned: Hours on platform, real 
experience (meaningful not the same thing over and over again), 
demonstrate BVLOS, have a mentor watch for some number of hours, 
shadow an experienced pilot for some number of hours, experience in 
congested airspace, simulator hours, hours working with the UAV you 
plan to fly. 
Ratings you need to 
get to fly more 
complicated missions 
as a crew 
4 10 BVLOS would require the equivalent of an instrument rating on the 
manned side, just because you’re having to look at effectively instruments. 
 
Not a quote but a list: BVLOS, some scaled down portion of the manned 
pilot IFR rating, manned commercial rating if you want to fly BVLOS. 
Things you need to 
learn about to fly 
UAV 
4 12 Ability to be able to read and interpret instruments, whether that be on a 
computer screen, and know that that means in terms of your aircraft in 3D 
space and in time. 
 
Not a quote but a list: An analysis of terrain avoidance, understanding 
what radio waves at different frequencies, ability to read and understand 
your instruments, prove ability to develop SA when BVLOS, manned a/c 
ground school. 
Basic qualifications to 
fly UAV 
3 7 You have to have the basic civilian ground school for manned aircraft 
and…add more on. 
Poor training/SA 1 1 He didn’t know that he had a box that he was supposed to climb in, to his 
altitude…actually we had same issue during data collection. 
Qualifications are 
unnecessary 
1 2 I never really consider their different rating, different qualification, or 
different certification to be able to do this. It’s not that complex. I would 
consider flying in the clouds under IFR much more challenging than 
operating an autonomous vehicle… . 
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Table A9.2.  Information Requirements 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Quantity Concerns about 
too much 
information 
3 7 If you have comm loss and it’s not doing lost link procedure, then you 
don’t have any control over it anyways. I’m just concerned that we 
flag too much, and we’re not paying attention to it. 
Quantity General 
information about 
other vehicles 
3 6 I was able to know that they were my space, and be able to 
communicate with them. 
 
Quantity Process of flying 
the UAV, 
building SA 
 
 
4 11 because he’s BVLOS, I have no eyes on the a/c so all I’ve got is my 
heads up display. Its synonymous to flying instruments on a manned 
a/c. when he’s flying it’s the constant scanning, signal strength, 
altitude, airspeed, battery voltage, waypoint, is the a/c doing what it’s 
supposed to, how bad is the a/c crabbing. 
Quantity Creative ways to 
get information 
1 2 What we did was we actually take and we run the exact same flight 
plan in simulation mode. So if we have a lost comm or a comm drop 
out we’ll know approximately where it should be during that lost 
comm period so we could tell VO stay here to recover it. 
Quality Short time to 
make decisions 
1 
 
2 Moving towards something very simple like that, where he can look 
at his a/c and he says okay I have traffic on my one o’clock and I have 
20 seconds to make a decision. 
Quality Usefulness of 
tools 
2 4 I thought was beneficial was having that iPad. My pilot was able to 
see a map of earth while he’s looking, and I was standing right next to 
him, and that’s how we knew when we were coming up against that 
imaginary wall. 
Quality Poor information 
from tool 
4 16 P1: So, honestly I couldn’t tell who is rogue or doing what. P2:...I had 
the same…an emergency, which confuses me…just to clarify…an 
emergency is yourself you said. 
Quality Information that 
crews would like 
to see in a tool 
4 10 Showing me all the other aircraft, I want to know, your speed, how far 
away that approaching vehicle is and what its altitude is. Corridor/ 
route and track of own vehicle, other vehicle bearing, heading, speed 
altitude, vertical change, type of aircraft in the same airspace, flight 
patterns for other vehicles, other aircraft, position, heading, speed, 
type, routing, predicted path, for self know position of vehicle 
(relative to boundary) [this is a list not just 1 quote[. 
Quality Decision making 4 6 One aircraft flyin around has all the information he needs to make 
decisions. 
Usability Type of 
information that 
is not useful 
4 5 Once you start that flight plan, the only warning you should get back 
from UTM is if somebody else has now encroached in to that area. 
That would be the only message I would want to hear. Not that “I 
want a change” message. I’m not gonna change my flight plan. 
Usability Clutter 2 
 
2 So I’m getting a lot of clutter, like me visually there is a lot stuff 
going on and when the solo’s flying, not only am I seeing the solo, 
seeing its flight path, seeing the UTM volume, seeing all these yellow 
targets. 
Usability Things that 
reduced usability 
1 1 It was a bit tedious to go in and try to find that message and 
especially, if I would be an one operator system like that. 
continued on next page 
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Table A9.2.  Information Requirements continued 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Usability Form of words to 
use in aural 
announcements 
2 
 
4 Starting off with ‘Other aircraft, south, 300ft, breaching your 
airspace’. 
Usability Usefulness of 
other tools for SA 
2 2 From our situation awareness display, when I see other general 
aviation a/c in the area, I can click on them and find out what’s 
going on with them. 
Usability Functions in a 
tool 
2 3 Always having an acknowledgement actions like request received 
and that we are processing it. Facing extremely high volume and 
this is your estimated wait time. 
GUI GUI for 
information in 
3 
 
11 
 
Maybe hearing an audible, because he may not be looking. Audible 
is key. 
Alerts Type of alerts that 
would be useful 
 
 
5 
 
21 Position, where it’s coming from, altitude, vehicle coming down 
due to an emergency, airspeed, heading, last known location, 
warning sound several seconds before reaching bounds [this is a 
list not a quote]. 
Hardware Concerns about 
running one 
computer 
3 9 Would you want the surveillance data integrated with your control 
screens? Texas: my opinion would be a separate screen. 
Hardware Concerns about 
amount of 
equipment that 
UTM takes 
1 3 I cannot see people having three or two laptops out and doing this 
much work. 
Comms Issues with team 
structure (comms) 
1 2 You still have to communicate there is an issue to the PICs… 
because they need enough time to make a decision. 
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Table A9.3.  Reporting 
Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
GUI items for 
outgoing 
information 
2 3 
 
[prompt: asked about flights crews interaction with UTM] my software 
contains all the telemetry data for the a/c, so my software is read by a 
translator...puts it all in the same format for all the different a/c, so he [USS 
Operator] can read it and sent it out however he needs to...so altitude, 
waypoints and where its supposed to be at, and the track as well, he’s able to 
see that. So I have to have my software running in order for him to get the 
data. 
Distracting actions 
that you can’t 
handle during an 
emergency 
2 2 (send message) That’s not the time to do it. As a flight crew you are 
concentrating & making decisions about what you’re doing on the flight 
crew. If you have something that starts saying “message” in the middle of a 
flight, that’s not a good idea. 
Important 
information to 
broadcast 
3 16 (not a comment but a list of items from various comments) Battery low, 
connectivity loss, need space, I need to put down. 
 
With [XX autoflight system] you could forward your nav link stream out 
over (UDP?) and using MAV proxy you could receive that and display it. So, 
if someone in the commanding positon wanted to see my flight state, but 
they weren’t actually issuing commands on the flight, you could forward it to 
them and they could see it just like they were flying but I’d be the one 
controlling it. 
Things you might 
not want to tell other 
people 
2 3 Do you want that vehicle to broadcast it remaining battery percentage to 
everyone else? 
 
Other items, list not quote: surveillance band that you’re using 
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Table A9.4.  Response Time 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Time Time taken to start 
corrective action 
4 20 I: how quickly could they reasonably expect you to correct? ND: I 
would imagine for most scenarios seconds would be the correct 
response. 
Time Using automation to 
reduce response 
time 
1 1 [paraphrased] need to integrate more automation to reduce the time 
for a plan change, specially when the vehicle is in the air, orbiting, 
burning batteries, waiting for approval of a plan change. This 
becomes a larger issue when the vehicle has a primary and 
secondary mission, and its costing money to wait. Time is money, 
so the speed of getting things accomplished is the challenge. 
Procedures Reasonable 
expectations of 
coordination with 
neighboring 
operations 
 
3 7 [prompt, paraphrased: a UAS is flying a neighboring mission and 
they made a mistake in their plan that puts them outside their 
volume, and they are coming towards your area of operation, what is 
reasonable expectation of coordination?] reasonably I would assume 
that they could modify their mission, if they realized they made an 
error...even if they did make a modification it would take a minute 
or two still, so even if you did change it right away it still takes time. 
Procedures Future procedures 
for off nominal 
events 
 
1 2 If the UTM system, in the future when you go rogue, it tells you 
what to do...and for a lot of this to work in dense environment it’s 
going to have to be really fast. It’s almost like the UTM system is 
going to have to be what actually controls the drones. 
SA Attention direction 
during a scan 
1 2 In Reno, I think they timed us and the most I would even look at 
either UTM or his laptop or the iPad…was 3 seconds. 
SA Source of off 
nominal information 
2 3 It would be nice to have interaction between the two neighboring 
missions, I mean more than just having notifications popping up, 
like this is going to go into your boundary, is that okay, like accept 
or deny kind of…like a request. 
SA Situation awareness 
of a UAV 
2 5 Having that iPad, I had situational awareness of what was happening 
with that UAV. I didn’t utilize it to it’s best [coughing], because I 
didn’t realize it at the time, but I could see what was going on. 
Decision 
Making 
Awareness of RTB 
options during flight 
 
 
2 6 It’s considering where I’m at…most of the a/c we’re flying with are 
just a direct flight home, so I want to consider quickly if that direct 
flight, you know if there are obstacles on the way or if that’s the 
most efficient way to come home or whatever. 
Decision 
Making 
Decision making 
(time) during an off 
nominal event 
2 5 [TX 12] If it had an RF interference located at the site, its highly 
likely that I would have dropped out again, so I made that split 
second decision to bring it home, be on the safe side. 
Workload Workload flying UA 3 4 
 
I’m also focused on monitoring the airspace with XX tool, I’m also 
focused on maintaining separation with the other a/c, even though 
there are VO’s. so there’s a lot to do. 
Workload Having to multitask 
during off nominals 
 
2 
 
2 P4: In terms of typing in while you’re flying and monitoring…P3: 
Yeah, you’re not gonna be able to do that. P4: It just takes your 
attention away from what you are supposed to be doing. 
Automation Using automation to 
assist 
4 8 I think the more we move from the operator to the UTM system for 
handling the situations will be better. Removing the human as much 
will be beneficial overall for autonomous system. 
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Table A9.5.  Operator Requirements 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
SA Attention when 
flying 
2 3 Awareness level is much higher when you have more traffic in the 
area. Where exactly are they even if they are not at the same 
altitude. Definitely more attentive. 
SA Reduce 
distractions to 
pilot 
1 2 That’s a good point, because PIC is ultimately responsible for safe 
operations of the aircraft and anything that distracts him from 
doing that job has to be evaluated or handed off to somebody else. 
SA 
 
 
Attention 
strategies for 
flying without a 
team 
1 2 But if the bird is in my area, part 107 rules, you don’t have to have 
a VO when flying by yourself, your face is rarely on the screen, 
you’re just checking vital stats, you’re keep your eyes on the bird 
the whole time. 
SA 
 
 
Skills you need to 
develop to fly 
UAS safely 
5 6 I check NOTAM for sure, so I would be aware, if there would be 
something out there. But yeah, most of my attention is devoted 
outside of my plane, looking down and of course looking up for 
obstructions and stuff, but I know the terrain and I know the point 
where I’m gonna turn and stuff. 
SA 
 
Access to UTM 
info 
1 2 So [the flight crews] don’t currently have a display. We want to do 
that, but we don’t currently have the resources or equipment 
available to do that. It would be ideal, just so they could see the 
visuals and know what’s happening from a UTM standpoint… . 
Procedures BVLOS ops 
requirements/ 
procedures 
1 4 [in reference to whether training changes with BVLOS] That 
should all be sense and avoid. I think [the same knowledge] would 
still apply, but you would apply it in a different manner. It’s the 
difference between, let’s go back to piloting, VFR and IFR. The 
ultimate result is to provide a safe flight from takeoff to landing 
and it’s just the manner you do it is different... . 
Procedures Procedures/ 
preparation for off 
nominal events 
 
2 3 
 
I don’t know how you could eliminate the human factor when 
you’re talking about the scenario like that. I just don’t see it. It 
doesn’t happen today, I mean airliners, under a TCAS conflict 
avoidance system. If something happens with the aircraft you talk 
about it first but then do it, maybe have something like that...but i 
don't know if you can have something specific like hard-coded 
procedures every time. 
Procedures Handling 
intruders in your 
airspace 
1 1 P3: Or you’re just gonna reason with them. You’ll try to find out 
who’s violating the airspace that you have reserved, & talk with 
them before you are going to risk losing a vehicle. 
Client 
function 
 
 
Client functions 6 13 If I were using it and I was a PIC and I had to use it myself rather 
than rely on somebody to import everything, having that ‘pause’ 
capability…that’s gold 
Workload Ways to reduce 
workload/ 
streamline 
operations 
1 2 [paraphrased] network reliabilty is a huge factor as well. Right 
now workload is higher than it probably will be in the future 
because of networking issues. 
 
continued on next page 
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Table A9.5.  Operator Requirements continued 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Planning Need for 
preflight 
planning, 
especially 
planning for off 
nominal events 
3 16 Planning from the beginning, anticipating any problems you might 
encounter, and say, ok, this is something that could go wrong 
here. We’re gonna go and send the airplane away from that if 
anything goes wrong. If there is lost comm then its gonna go away 
from that mountain or away from that tower. 
Planning Preparing the 
crew as part of 
flight prep 
 
 
2 4 We do a crew brief and mission brief...so the entire crew for that 
a/c, including the VO’s knows what the a/c is supposed to be 
doing at any given time, that why they know that if the a/c is 
supposed to be going north and all of a sudden its spiraling south, 
something’s not right. 
Teamwork 
 
Usefulness of 
team members 
with respect to 
SA 
4 8 If you are BVLOS and you have a VO who has eyes on, or even if 
its line of sight and you have a VO that’s watching it, it could help 
so they could keep an eye on the a/c while you build these points 
or make a decision based on the map 
Teamwork 
 
 
Team 
organization 
3 5 [paraphrased] it depends on what triggers the modification…if it 
was a simple change like the PIC wanted to leave the area and go 
somewhere else, that would be initiated by the pilot and 
coordinated with the manager, but if there was an intruder or a 
priority mission, then the manager would initiate and help 
coordinate since he has more awareness of other traffic. 
Team 
work 
 
Crew structure/ 
flow of UTM 
information 
 
 
2 10 he was calling out stuff that I couldn’t see because he had eyes on 
it and I was operating just off listening to him. That’s where CRM 
comes in and good teamwork. We’re flying 1000ft mile out, he 
stayed eyes up, I stay eyes down because you look at that 
computer screen, even if you’ve got it dimmed down, you’re 
going to lose your night vision. So he sat in front, I was behind 
him, so his eyes would acclimate to the dark and stay acclimated. I 
stayed on the screen and communicated everything. 
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Table A9.6.  Flight Tests 
Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Planning/scripting test 
for safety 
1 3 What a holding pattern does…is ditch points and you put those in a spot 
where if we lost power for rason descend into one of the orbits and orbit 
down till it lands on the ground. But at least we know where it will be. 
Importance of real 
world testing 
2 3 It’s important to do real world scenarios when you’re doing testing, 
because testing is a controlled, sanitary environment, but what these guys 
are striving to do is to take that sanitary environment and put it in a 
situation where it could be utilized. 
Unresolved test issues 3 
 
18 It’s like you’re requesting to start in the past rather than in the present. 
Like, I want to start in 10 seconds but 20 seconds goes by and it’s still 
waiting to receive the message and finally it receives the flight plan and 
20 seconds has passed and it says “I can’t start you”! 
Limited understanding 
of UTM 
2 4 
 
And this is three iterations, I have worked on it. So, when those questions 
are asked, I have a really hard time honestly answering how well it 
[UTM] worked with my aircraft. 
Test coordination 2 2 You should already have it coordinated and its already set to go, and they 
are getting the feedback they meaning they have the telemetry that they 
are looking for. They see the aircraft on the ground and once its takes 
flight, the flight crew doesn’t care about that. 
Feedback is through the 
group not a display 
1 2 Because of our proximity to one other and chatting beforehand. We had 
the visuals, we had like parties talking to one another & then everybody 
was reading body language too. 
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Table A9.7.  Other Comments 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Airspace sharing/ 
volumes 
UTM philosophy 5 
 
15 
 
I don’t know how viable this is for you (...) but look at 
the aircraft’s position and segment and dynamically 
scale the time allowed left based on its position. So it 
just sits at the beginning of the position don’t count 
down the time left in the segment because it’s not flying 
towards the end, but then if its flies towards the end of 
the segment and its half way through, then you could 
say well the first half took 2 minutes, and the second 
half will take a similar amount… 
Airspace sharing/ 
volumes 
UTM feature 
suggestion and 
implementation 
5 15 [in response to prompt about UTM and going non-
conforming/rogue on one mission] On turn and takeoff I 
was able to have my home position marked, so just for 
getting the mission done, I flew it manually and I had an 
idea of the corridor, but I must have breached outside of 
that. [didn’t have UTM screen up that day] And then 
obviously not having your mission manager, I can’t see 
that. 
Future/Forward 
looking (includes: 
equipage, USS 
features, fleet ops) 
Crew/team roles 3 7 The future state is automated flight ops with one person 
managing multiple aircraft. 
Future/Forward 
looking 
Vehicle equipage 3 6 [paraphrased] I like the idea of UTM handling weather 
info, but only if there is a small degree of error. I don’t 
want the system to restrict a mission if things are really 
fine. 
Future/Forward 
looking 
Concept 4 9 You could potentially have a service that broadcasts the 
current priorities of the a/c and the a/c could query that 
service and then assign their flight controller procedures 
based on their queue in that list of priorities. 
Future/Forward 
looking 
Priority 2 2 Some type of vehicle priority. So either prioritizing 
remaining flight time, vehicle size or vehicle 
importance, because its pretty easy to sense two vehicles 
and to sense when you’re close to another vehicle, but 
the difficulty is making the decision of who give right of 
way to whom. 
Future/Forward 
looking 
Security 1 2 Seems like aircraft will be categorized based on 
applications used like delivery, mapping, surveillance, 
New York police and where we may be. And we can 
have generalized category for things like XX delivery. 
Things which were intended to be used for delivery 
systems (...) You can feel more comfortable with that 
aircraft in the air because it is more well known 
commercial product to trust who keep their integrity of 
what they are trying to achieve. 
continued on next page 
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Table A9.7.  Other Comments  continued 
Category Theme Site Com. Example Comments 
Emergency Ops Working with 
emergency 
personnel 
2 5 In the real world when agencies and people come together in 
___ types scenarios, it could be this big, or this big, and it 
grows as needed, we share resources. 
Emergency Ops Getting help 
from others 
1 2 You could say “okay, message this guy, and ask him if he can 
help us out” In UTM, usually most operators have a phone 
number attached to them as a point of contact. 
Risk assessment Risk 
assessment 
4 4 Really running [into] another UAV isn’t our main concern, our 
big concern is running [in]to manned asset, helicopter or 
aircraft. If we have another UAV, well big deal, but taking 
down manned aviation, now you’re talking people getting hurt 
seriously. 
Need for 
standardization 
and definition 
Procedures 2 4 CW: ...set procedures for lost link? P: we could define one, but 
it depends on the platform.... you need to turn it around, this is 
what we can do based on platforms we have, based on 
software we have. So we don’t disagree that there should be 
one, it just has to be implemented always the way someone is 
defining it. Again, some standardization on how you’re going 
to do this. 
Need for 
standardization 
and definition 
Terminology 
can create 
confusion 
1 3 I think it’s the mere fact that it was returning to launch point, 
he was calling it RTB. So there wasn’t necessarily a 
delineation between those two, but they’re both called the 
same thing, because the end result is we’re returning back to 
launch. 
Need for 
standardization 
and definition 
Units of 
measurement 
1 5 [manufacturer] Talks in feet, I talk in feet, that’s what NASA 
wants is feet. Certain other people here in the building do 
things in meters and I resisted that and so we had that conflict 
just internally which was problematic. 
How equipment 
works 
Procedures 4 
 
14 [asked about how certain vehicles have built in buffers] With 
ours you can actually set a buffer, so it won’t actually breach 
the fence, right now with ours, its set to 2 meters, so if you’re 
flying right at it, it will actually stop 2 meters before you hit 
the fence. And you could either have it stop, RTL or land. 
How equipment 
works 
Tools (on board 
in environment) 
3 11 That spectrum is available and not being used right now, 
repurposing it shouldn’t take that long, but it is the FAA and 
FCC. 
Wider 
environment 
Public trust 1 4 Its interesting for the general public to have some assurance 
that there is some drone which is flying over their house is not 
spying on them and doing something appropriate in the 
airspace system. 
Wider 
environment 
Hazards 1 2 Someone can throw up a mesh-network with a 100 foot tower 
without any question. They don't have to light it, they don't 
have to do anything. 
 
 
 
